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CHINA'S DIRECT MARKETING BAN: A CASE STUDY
OF CHINA'S RESPONSE TO CAPITAL-BASED SOCIAL
NETWORKS
Michele A. Wong
Abstract: China's State Administration for Industry and Commerce issued a
circular on April 18, 1998 banning all forms of multi-level direct marketing, citing
concerns with social stability and economic order. While the direct marketing ban was
ultimately implemented in such a way as to allow those who engaged in network
marketing to transition to retail sales, alleviating some of the violence of the protest to the
ban, opposition to the ban has continued both domestically and abroad. Direct marketing
organizations create tight-knit, extensive networks of individuals with similar economic
interests. By assembling around a common economic interest, the group may also
emerge as a self-motivated political force, particularly when personal economic interests
are tested. This latent risk of political activism poses a threat to the authoritarian regime
in China. The state's response in issuing a blanket ban of all direct marketing activity
illustrates its apprehension of private social and economic networks, and its inability and
reluctance to seek regulatory alternatives. As China's economic system continues to
evolve under the post-1978 market reform policy, the administration will need to adapt its
political approach in order to better understand and respond to the demands of a
population with expanding private interests, as well as a growing desire to pursue and
protect those interests.
I. INTRODUCTION
The complex mechanics of leveraging dense personal networks to
achieve social, political and financial goals permeates the history of Chinese
culture. With the advent of economic reform, such network mechanisms
have taken on a new function in the exploding consumerism of modem
China. Direct marketing, a popular business development tool in the United
States for decades, was introduced to the Chinese market in the late-1980s.
Soon, tens of thousands of Chinese were engaged in multi-level marketing,
through legitimate and illegitimate organizations, generating hundreds of
millions of dollars in revenue. However, in late April 1998, China's State
Council issued a blanket ban of all direct marketing activities' announcing
I Circular of the State Council Concerning the Ban of Operational Activities of Pyramid Sales
(1998) [hereinafter Pyramid Sales Ban]. The Pyramid Sales Ban is translated in the Appendix to this
Comment.
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that "the nation's weak regulatory system is not sufficient to protect
consumers from swindlers cloaked as direct salespeople."
2
Part II of this Comment profiles direct marketing and briefly describes
post-1978 economic reform in China. This background section also
examines the implementation and effects of the direct marketing ban,
including the ambiguous legal status of this type of State Council regulation.
Part III discusses the emerging antagonism between the new social and
economic demands of the post-Mao reform era and the continuing
authoritarian role of the state, as illustrated by the direct marketing ban.
Finally, Part IV concludes that as China's economic system continues to
evolve under the post-1978 market reform policy, the administration will
need to adapt its political approach in order to better understand and respond
to the demands of a population with expanding private interests, as well as a
growing desire to pursue and protect those interests.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Multi-Level Direct Marketing
3
Understanding the difference between a legitimate direct network
marketing business model and an illegitimate pyramid scheme is a
prerequisite to the critical examination of China's blanket ban on direct
marketing. The fundamental distinction between the two models lies in the
definition of the revenue-generating mechanism, i.e., whether it is product-
based or recruitment-based. In a direct multi-level marketing business-like
Amway, Avon, Mary Kay, or Tupperware-revenue comes primarily from
product sales. 4 Direct marketers generate income through commissions
from product sales. The role of the network mechanism comes in when a
direct marketer recruits a new marketer, often referred to as her "downline.
' 5
The recruiting marketer then receives a commission from all sales made by
2 ABC-CLIO, Government Bans Direct Marketing, in KALEIDOSCOPE CHINA, LEXIS (Apr. 22,
1998).
3 This type of business model is also known as direct marketing, network marketing, and direct
sales, terms that are used interchangeably throughout this Comment. The terminology used in the April
1998 ban is zhi xiao, which literally means, "direct sales" or "direct selling." However, the official English
translation by Xinhua of the term as applied in the April 18, 1998 ban is "pyramid sales." See Pyramid
Sales Ban, supra note 1.
4 Direct Selling Education Foundation, Pyramid Schemes. Not What They Seem, in THE DIRECT
SELLING INDUSTRY (1997), at http://www.dsa.org/pyramid.stm.
5 Id.
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6
her downline, in addition to the commissions from her own sales. Thus, an
incentive to recruit is created by the net product sales commissions.
In the typical pyramid scheme, revenue is generated primarily from
recruitment alone. 7 Recruits are required to invest amounts of capital,
sometimes substantial, to take part in the business.8 Those who bring in the
new recruits receive a commission from the initiation fees of their recruits
and any new members introduced by their recruits, and so on.9 Thus, the
pyramid is established, with earlier or founding members receiving
substantial commissions based on extensive multi-layer recruitment. Jon M.
Taylor' ° describes three distinguishing characteristics that can be used as
tools to determine whether a business model is in fact an illegitimate
pyramid scheme:
1. A chaining hierarchy of levels of distributors-more
than is functionally justified-is recruited without area
limits, which leads to extreme leverage and perceived
saturation in the marketplace.
2. Relative vertical equality in compensation systems
leads to extreme horizontal inequality in payout over
the network of distributors-huge payouts to a tiny
percentage of participants, while the vast majority
wind up losing the money and effort they invested
over a period of time.
3. Significant purchase or recruiting quotas are required
(or incentives offered) to qualify for increasing bonus
levels or purchasing discounts in an ascending
hierarchy of payout levels (the "pay to play" feature).'1
6 Id.
' The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") defines "pyramid schemes" as plans which: (1)
"concentrate on the commissions you could earn just for recruiting new distributors;" (2) "generally ignore
the marketing and selling of products and services." Jon M. Taylor, Product-Based Pyramid Schemes:
When Should an MLM or Network Marketing Program Be Considered an Illegal Pyramid Scheme?, in
PYRAMID SCHEME ALERT (2000), at http://www.pyramidschemealert.org/resources/ppabstract.htm.
8 Direct Selling Education Foundation, supra note 4.
9 Id.
10 Jon M. Taylor is a direct marketing consultant with an MBA from Brigham Young University in
1965 and a Ph.D. in Applied Psychology from the University of Utah in 1986.
11 Taylor, supra note 7.
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The fundamental weakness of this type of business is the absence of
any meaningful, long-term revenue generating potential. Such businesses
often have low quality product or no product at all to offer. 12 Capital
acquisition is based purely on new memberships, and new members join
hoping that they have come in early enough to profit.' 3 Recruiters often play
on people's dreams of quick money to draw new members into such
pyramid schemes. When such businesses ultimately collapse, there is little,
if any, recourse for the vast majority of members who did not come in early
enough to profit.
China's April 1998 blanket ban on direct marketing targeted not only
illegitimate pyramid schemes, but also prohibited any other form of network
marketing activity. 14 Rather than drawing a distinction between the two
business models, and instituting a regulatory framework that would allow
Chinese to engage in a genuine business opportunity, while at the same time
prohibiting pyramid scams, a radical blanket ban was imposed by the state.
China's approach to direct marketing illustrates the tension that has persisted
since economic reform began in 1978 between an increasingly capitalist
market and an enduring authoritarian government.
B. Economic Reform in China
China set in motion its modem economic reform strategy at the
meeting of the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee in
December 1978.'5 Starting first with agricultural reform in the rural sector,
the state did not begin to institute urban reform until 1984.16 China's urban
reform policy from 1984 to the present has proceeded in three primary
phases.' 7
The initial phase of urban reform (1984-1989) brought "changes in
enterprise structure, prices, finance, banking, housing, labor markets,
welfare, pensions, and wages."' 8 Soon the economy was expanding beyond
the limited formal institutional control of the state. 19 An epidemic of
12 Direct Selling Education Foundation, supra note 4.
13 id.
:4 See Pyramid Sales Ban, supra note 1.
'5 Communiqu& of the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist
Party of China (Dec. 22, 1978).
16 WENFANG TANG & WILLIAM L. PARISH, CHINESE URBAN LIFE UNDER REFORM: THE CHANGING
SOCIAL CoNTRAcT 22-23 (2000).
17 id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
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bureaucratic profiteering, along with uncontrolled inflation, threatened the
rapidly expanding economy.
20
In the next phase (1989-1992), through an "economic austerity
program" and incidents such as the suppression of urban protest at
Tiananmen Square in 1989, the state attempted to slow reform. 21 In this
phase, state control of the economy was bolstered at the expense of political
freedom.22
The current phase of reform was signaled by Deng Xiaoping's famous
1992 speech, which emphasized a neoautboritarian approach to reform,
focused on economic modernization combined with strict political control.23
In the post-Deng era, it is this neoauthoritarian approach that guides the
policy of the state in China's continued development.
24
China's methodology as a transitional economy is unique. Rather
than abruptly switching to a market economy, as the former Soviet Union
and Eastern European countries attempted, China's policy has been one of
gradual reform. 25 For example, rather than allowing its public industry and
state-owned enterprises to be supplanted by immediate privatization, China
has sheltered them through bank loans and tax benefits.
2
Andrew Walder2 7 describes the general macro-historical trends
that have been associated with the waning of communism: "global
military and economic competition, the rigidities and inefficiencies of
central planning, declining consumer living standards, a decline in the
legitimacy of the party and its ideology, and the gradual emergence of
oppositional movements. 28 From this perspective the key question is
whether China's transitional economy damages party cohesion, and
thus leads to the emergence of political opposition, or whether political
opposition first emerges and thereby undermines the party hegemony.
China's severe response in banning the social and economic
networks produced by multi-level marketing suggests that the threat
such networks pose to "social stability"29 is at least in part perceived as
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id. For a more extensive account of the reform era under Deng Xiaoping, see generally RICHARD
BAUM, BURYING MAO (1996).
24 TANG & PARISH, supra note 16, at 22-23.
25 Andrew G. Walder, Interpreting its Significance, in CHINA'S TRANSITIONAL ECONOMY 1, 10-11
(Andrew G. Walder ed., 1996).
26 See id.
27 Professor of Sociology at Harvard University.
28 Andrew G. Walder, The Quiet Revolution From Within: Economic Reform as A Source of
Political Decline, in THE WANING OF THE COMMUNIST STATE 1, 3 (Andrew G. Walder ed., 1995).
29 See Pyramid Sales Ban, supra note 1.
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a threat to the Chinese Communist Party ("CCP") and the state's
authority.
C. The Authority of a State Council Regulation
The implementation of the policy against, and the ultimate blanket
ban on, direct marketing is illustrative of the complexity and, in some cases,
ambiguity of the lawmaking process in China today. In China, many
national laws and regulations are promulgated by the administrative branch
of the government overseen by the State Council, rather than by the National
People's Congress ("NPC"), the legislative branch of government.
However, China's Constitution is sometimes vague and ambiguous with
respect to the assignment of lawmaking authority between the two branches.
The actions of the NPC and the State Council also contribute to this
ambiguity.
The State Council is in effect the executive branch of government. 30
The State Council oversees more than sixty government departments,
including the central commissions like the State Planning Commission, as
well as the numerous ministries and bureaus that constitute the base of the
administrative hierarchy. 3 CCP members hold the key positions of power
in the State Council. For example the Premier and Vice-Premiers of the
State Council are generally members of the Standing Committee of the
Politburo, the CCP leadership.32 Article 89 of the 1982 Constitution grants
the State Council the power to issue administrative directives and
regulations in the form of official documents (gongwen).33 In this form, the
State Council defines government policy at the highest level, which is then
transmitted and filtered down through the administrative bureaucracy to
reach the local level.34  In general, the State Council's rules of public
conduct, or administrative regulations (xingzheng fagui), are treated and
enforced as the official law, but they may be challenged or voided if they
contradict the Constitution or laws passed by the NPC.35
30 The Legislation Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 56 (adopted by the Third Session of
the Ninth National People's Congress on Mar. 15, 2000) [hereinafter The Legislation Law]; Perry Keller,
Legislation in the People's Republic of China, 23 U.B.C.L. REv. 653, 669 (1989) (citing THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, adopted Dec. 4 1982, by the Fifth Session of the
Fifth NPC, pmbl.)
"' The Legislation Law, supra note 30, art. 71.
32 Keller, supra note 30, at 669.
33 XIANFA [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] art. 89, sec. 1 (1982).
34 Keller, supra note 30, at 669-70.
31 The Legislation Law, supra note 30, art. 91; XIANFA art. 67, sec. 7. See also Keller, supra note
30, at 669-70.
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The 1982 Constitution granted the NPC more clearly delineated
legislative power, declaring that the NPC had sole authority to enact and
amend those "basic laws" (jiben falu) dealing with "criminal offences, civil
affairs, the state organs and other matters." 3  However, it was left unclear
how this altered the State Council's role, which under earlier versions of the
Constitution included the power to adopt "administrative measures;
administrative laws and regulations (xingzheng fagui); and orders in
accordance with the Constitution and national laws (falu)."37  The State
Council can also refer draft laws to the NPC and its Standing Committee for
adoption.38
While not expressly defined in the Constitution, the State Council's
role appears to be expanding. Since 1982, the NPC has additionally
authorized the State Council to promulgate temporary legislation (zhanxing
tiaoli, zhanxing guiding) on issues of economic reform and restructuring, as
well as opening trade. 39 The intent of this grant of authority is to permit the
State Council greater freedom to experiment with innovative new policies.
The direct marketing ban is an example of these short-term regulations
promulgated by the State Council in response to concern over the perceived
dangers of rapid market reform. Yet, the legal status of this "empowered
legislation" (shouquan fa) and the time limits on its effectiveness remain ill
defined .40 For the businesses engaged in direct marketing, this lack of
predictability in the law can be costly because building such a business may
require an investment of thousands of dollars, and yet can be wiped out
36 MURRAY S. TANNER, THE POLITICS OF LAWMAKING IN CHINA 44-46 (1999).
37 XIANFA [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] art. 89, sec. 2.
38 The Legislation Law, supra note 30, art. 56(ii).
3' The Legislation Law, supra note 30, art. 9. See also The Decision of the Third Session of the
Sixth National People's Congress on Authorizing the State Council to Formulate Interim Provisions or
Regulations Concerning the Reform of the Economic Structure and the Open Policy (adopted at the Third
Session of the Sixth National People's Congress on Apr. 10, 1985), http://www.embonline.net/english/e-
Law/legisl-2.htm:
With a view to ensuring the smooth progress of the reform of the economic structure and
the implementation of the open policy, the Third Session of the Sixth National People's
Congress has decided to authorize the State Council to formulate, promulgate and
implement, whenever necessary, interim provisions or regulations concerning the reform
of the economic structure and the open policy in accordance with the Constitution
without contravening the relevant laws and the basic principles of the relevant decisions
of the National People's Congress and its Standing Committee, and to report them to the
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress for the record. These provisions
and regulations shall be made into law by the National People's Congress or its Standing
Committee after they are tested in practice and when conditions are ripe.
' TANNER, supra note 36, at 44-46.
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without warning. However, the Chinese approach has evolved from long-
standing tradition:
First, the Confucian tradition emphasizes moral values and
moral instruction (not fear of legal sanctions) as a basis for
guiding behavior and maintaining social order. Second, the
Chinese Communist Party has long viewed the legal system as
a means to implement state policy, not as a basis for articulating
and guaranteeing the rights of citizens .... [T]hird, and finally,
the Chinese legal system is underdeveloped.4'
Furthermore, lawmaking in China is complicated by the CCP, which
fundamentally drives national policy and is inseparable from the official
bodies of government administration. The CCP has formally constituted
"party core groups" in the various government ministries.42 The party core
group includes the top few party members in each government ministry and
commission.4 3 These individuals caucus as party members to decide issues
confronting the ministry and to review appropriate directions from above. 44
They then don their government hats as ministers and vice ministers to issue
directives and carry them out.4 5
In the late 1980s, reformers sought to phase out the party core groups,
arguing both that they no longer served a distinctive purpose and that
talented nonparty individuals should be allowed to hold a few top
positions.4 6 This idea was actually adopted as policy in 1987, but its
implementation remained incomplete and reportedly was aborted in the
wake of the Tiananmen Square repression in June 1989.47 "Party life thus
forms another brick... in the edifice of Chinese Communist party controls
over the government and other bodies. 48
Perry Keller 49 explains how the transformation of CCP policy into
legislation is a source of many of China's law and policy conflicts:
41 XIAOYING MA & LEONARD ORTOLANO, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN CHINA: INSTITUTIONS,
ENFORCEMENT, AND COMPLIANCE 90 (2000) (Discussing the deficiencies of Chinese administration in the
context of environmental regulation, Ma and Ortolano explain historical traditions underlying the Chinese
system.).
42 KENNETH LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA: FROM REVOLUTION THROUGH REFORM 213-14
(1995).
43 Id.
44 id.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 id.
48 id.
41 Professor of International and Comparative Law at King's College London, School of Law.
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There does not appear to be any established procedure for this
transformation process and it is often unclear when a law is no
longer in effect due to a change in policy. This has been
especially noticeable in the economic reform program in which
legislation lagged far behind the implementation of new reform
projects. 5°
The lines of legal authority and procedures between China's major
lawmaking institutions remain unclear. Chinese law only gives the most
general guidance on the question of which legal documents should be
promulgated by the State Council, which by the NPC Standing Committee,
and which by the NPC plenary session. 51 Jurisdictional disputes are
inevitable and common between Party, State Council and NPC officials,
who must separately negotiate which state organ will promulgate each law.
The result "is a system which is unclear even to those officials who work
within it."52
Murray S. "Scot" Tanner 53 further explains the growing political
incongruity:
On controversial reform issues, many members of the NPC
Standing Committee have been openly critical of State Council-
sponsored innovations when they came before the Standing
Committee in the form of draft laws. Faced with such
opposition, the State Council has declined, in some cases, to
submit such reform policies to the NPC Standing Committee's
scrutiny, choosing instead to simply continue to implement the
policy under the documentary rubric of a Party Central
Document or a State Council "temporary regulation.,
54
This ambiguity in lawmaking can complicate the assessment made by
investors when they are deciding whether to engage in business in China
because they are unable to accurately appraise costs and risks. It is this lack
of consistency, predictability, and transparency in the lawmaking and
regulatory process that sometimes creates an insurmountable barrier to doing
50 Keller, supra note 30, at 658-59.
s TANNER, supra note 36, at 46-47.
52 Id.
53 Associate Professor of Chinese and East Asian Politics at Western Michigan University.
54 TANNER, supra note 36, at 47.
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business in China. The combination of ambiguity in the lawmaking process
and the permeation of party politics in legislative activity only serves to
further highlight China's need for political reform in the form of structural
continuity, consistency in regulation, and legislative transparency, as market
reform progresses.
D. Direct Marketing in China
1. Prior to the 1998 Ban
Prior to the 1998 direct sales ban in Mainland China, there were an
estimated thirty million direct marketers, and as many as 2,300 Chinese
enterprises, ranging vastly in legitimacy of business practice.5 5 While the
ban certainly terminated the operations of a large number of scam
organizations, its suitability must be evaluated in light of the legitimate
business operations of domestic and transnational corporations. American
direct marketing firms had a significant and growing presence prior to the
ban. United States companies already doing business in China included
Avon,56 Sara Lee, Mary Kay,57 and Amway. By April 1998, Mary Kay,
Avon and Amway had invested an estimated $200 million in China 9.5  With
the growing population of unemployed Chinese, some individuals saw direct
marketing as an unparalleled business opportunity. Asiaweek reported prior
to the ban that "[l]ife in the central city of Wuhan was disrupted recently
when some 50,000 hopefuls converged in search of work at its forty or so
direct-sales firms."6 °
55 For China, the Direct-Marketing Ban Hurts More Than It Helps, ASIAWEEK, May 8, 1998, at 14
[hereinafter For China, the Direct-Marketing Ban Hurts].
56 Avon, with its distribution model focused on salespeople engaged in door-to-door, presentation-
oriented marketing of personal care products, was the first to enter the Chinese market in Guangzhou in the
late-1980s. With the alluring potential of the Chinese market, where personal retail sales is embedded in
the consumer tradition, other large direct marketing firms soon followed Avon. See Matthew Miller,
Despite Bumpy Start, Doorstep Sales Win Over Mainland, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 12, 1998, at 2.
Avon recorded revenues of seventy-five million dollars in 1997, the year prior to the ban. Amy Lo, Selling
Dreams: The Mary Kay Way, ASIAWEEK, June 29, 2001.
57 Texas-based Mary Kay entered the Chinese market in Shanghai in 1995. See Miller, supra note
56. The cosmetics direct marketing business soon expanded to Beijing, Tianjin, Nanjing, Wuxi, Ningbo,
and Hangzhou. Id. By 1998, Mary Kay had employed approximately 9,000 "beauty consultants," with the
average consultant earning between 800 and 900 RMB per month. Id. Product sales in China reached
twenty-five million dollars in 1997, about eighty percent growth over the previous year, and continued to
expand up to the April 1998 ban. Id.
58 Amway, the largest foreign direct marketing corporation doing business in China, earned as much
as $178 million in 1997. Lo, supra note 56. The company had eight distribution outlets and a factory in
southern Guangdong province to manufacture home and health-care products. Id.
59 Id.
60 See For China, the Direct-Marketing Ban Hurts, supra note 55.
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Prior to the 1998 ban, the State Administration for Industry and
Commerce ("SAIC") made several attempts to regulate direct marketers and
eliminate illegal practices, such as pyramid scams, misrepresentation, and
distribution of over-priced, shoddy products. Two re-certification
campaigns were initiated between 1995 and 1997 through which hundreds of
illegal operations were closed down.61 Additionally, in September 1995, the
National Industrial and Commercial Bureau ("NICB") instituted a seven-
month moratorium on all direct sales business. The NICB carried out an
investigation into the organizations then engaged in the business, after which
62
only forty-one of 163 firms were permitted to resume operations.
Following the 1995 investigation, the NICB imposed new rules on the direct
marketing business, including a ban on direct sales of medicine, jewelry, and
fresh food.63 Mandatory training became a requirement for all direct sales
staff. Civil servants, soldiers on active duty, journalists, doctors and
teachers were all barred from engaging in the business.64 However, the
restrictions were apparently ineffective in regulating the growing business.
Therefore, rather than once again expending time and resources in
determining and resolving the problems and issues surrounding the direct
sales business, the administration simply declared a complete ban on any
and all activity related to direct marketing.
2. The Regulation of Direct Marketing in China
On April 18, 1998 the State Council issued the blanket ban on direct,
multi-level marketing.65 Under the ban, all companies engaged in network
marketing were ordered to cease operations by October 31, 1998.66 The
broad prohibition included the business activities of transnational
corporations such as Amway, Avon, Mary Kay, and Tupperware. 67 The
official notice claimed that direct marketing led to the "spreading [of]
heretical beliefs, ganging up, superstition, and hooliganism which seriously
deviate from the requirements of building of spiritual civilization and affect
social stability in China."
68
61 id.
62 Mark O'Neill, Direct Selling Branded Social Evil as Mainland Moves Towards Ban, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Mar. 30, 1998, at 1.
63 id.
64Id.
65 See Pyramid Sales Ban, supra note 1.
66 id.
67 Economic Affairs: Government Bans Direct Marketing, KALEIDOSCOPE, Apr. 22, 1998.
68 See Pyramid Sales Ban, supra note 1.
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In the months prior to the announcement of the direct marketing ban,
the administration had foreshadowed its intended policy through television
and newspaper campaigns focusing on the "evils of direct sales." 69
Orchestrated by the CCP's propaganda department, stories were told of
innocent people driven insane after losing their life savings to scamming
direct marketers. 70  Senior police officials warned that direct selling could
become "uncontrollable and a danger to social stability. '7 1 The NICB Fair
Trade Bureau Chief, Li Bida, stated that direct selling was "bringing
calamity to the nation and the people."' 72 Vice Premier, Li Lanqing
announced that "under present market conditions, direct selling had caused
many abuses and should be banned. 73
One year following the ban, the administration still found itself
expending extensive resources to enforce the prohibition. In October 1999,
the State Administration of Industry and Commerce again released a circular
ordering local administration across the country to concentrate on a "market
clean-up." 7 The SAIC dedicated twelve squads to assist local
administrations in investigating business deals with "corrupt overtones,
cronyism, and rude work manners. 7 5 In one interview, the Director of the
Inspection Office of the SAIC, Cheng Xin, explained that "the main target in
the crackdown is the illegal pyramid scheme .... It has done damage to
69 O'Neill, supra note 62.
70 Id.
71 Id. The Chinese government's concern about the pervasive danger of unregulated pyramid
schemes came in part from witnessing the turmoil in Albania following the collapse of pyramid investment
schemes in late 1996 and 1997, which resulted in thousands losing their life savings and triggering riots in
which almost 2,000 people died. See INT'L HELSINKI FEDERATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT
1998: ALBANIA (1998), at http://www.ihf-hr.org. However, the turmoil in Albania was rooted deeply,
beyond merely the peril of corrupt pyramid schemes. Id.
The chaotic events could not be attributed solely to the tragic loss of savings, for which
the Democratic Party appeared at least partly responsible due to its close links to the
"pyramid" scheme companies. The roots of the breakdown of the rule of law lay in long-
standing political disillusionment of the population in the face of the failure of economic
recovery. Moreover, the authoritarian rule of the Democratic Party and President Sali
Berisha and their control over electronic media, law enforcement agencies and the
judiciary; persistent disregard for human rights; undermining of democracy; corruption
and mismanagement played a decisive role in the developments of early 1997.
Id.
72 O'Neill, supra note 62.
73 Id.
74 Li Ming, Efforts to End Illegal Markets, CHINA DAILY, May 8, 2000.
75 The "clean-up" was purported to combat the prevalence of "fraudulent products, illegal companies
and factories, copyright violation, and direct selling-particularly pyramid schemes." See Pyramid Sales
Ban, supra note 1.
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many people and even caused serious social unrest in some places." 76
Cheng cited an incident in which a crowd numbering in the thousands
descended upon the headquarters of a pyramid scheme in Taihe County,
Anhui Province, that had been closed by the government. To illustrate the
dangerous mob mentality influence of such organizations, Cheng announced
that "the revival of pyramid schemes will be stopped., 77 The SAIC publicly
reiterated the policy of the direct sales ban as recently as April 2000 .78
3. Domestic Protest to the Ban and Pressure from Abroad
The announcement of the April 1998 ban sparked protest both
domestically and abroad. In Zhangjiajie, a city in Hunan, a protest against
the ban erupted into a riot.7 9 Authorities reported that hundreds of people
involved in direct sales smashed cars and looted stores. It was also
reported that at least ten people were killed during the protests in the Hunan
city of Hengyang.81 As one newspaper explained, "Resistance is fortified by
a growing fear of unemployment, with state factories laying off millions, the
government committed to slashing bureaucracy and China's su er-charged
economy showing signs of a possibly serious slowdown ahead."
8
Prior to China's recent accession to the World Trade Organization
(WTO), frustration with the 1998 direct marketing ban was also expressed
from abroad. During the United States-China WTO accession negotiations
between 1996 and 1998, disputes arose over numerous specific issues,
including but not limited to labor practices, agriculture restrictions,
telecommunication regulations, and unfair distribution rights policy towards
foreigners. 83 Most relevant to the issue of direct sales, particularly foreign
direct marketing corporations, was the tension during negotiations over
distribution and retail rights:
The PRC had not agreed to grant distribution rights-such as
wholesaling, retailing, maintenance and repair, and
transportation-to foreign companies. In other words, foreign
companies could not own and operate distribution networks
76 Li Ming, supra note 74.
77 id.
78 Direct Marketing a No No in China, CHINAONLINE, Apr. 5, 2000.
7' Renee Schoof, Hundreds Riot Over Ban on Direct Marketing, AAP NEWSFEED, Apr. 27, 1998.
so Id.
s Andrew Higgins, Avon Calling? Not in China, THE GUARDIAN (LONDON), May 1, 1998, at 18.
82 id.
83 Raj Bhala, Enter the Dragon: An Essay on China's WTO Accession Saga, 15 AM. U. INT'L L.
REv. 1469, 1487-89 (2000).
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within the PRC. These networks were controlled by state-run
Chinese companies. A foreign firm could not conduct
marketing, after-sales service, maintenance and repair, and
customer support unless its business license from the
government allowed it to do so. Yet, distribution was a service
and, pursuant to the General Agreement on Trade in Services
("GATS"), was a legitimate subject for negotiation. While the
PRC had guaranteed foreign companies would have equal
access, along with domestic firms, to distribution and
transportation networks, the PRC needed to grant foreign
companies the opportunity to set up and control these networks
so they could get their wares to market. American companies
like Amway, Avon, and Mary Kay Cosmetics, which relied on
direct selling, were examples of foreign firms whose access
was limited by the PRC's strictures. 4
U.S. trade representatives met with Chinese officials to discuss the
issue of the Pyramid Sales Ban and its impact on U.S. direct marketing
companies soon after the ban was imposed in 1998.85 Whether China will
remove or modify the Pyramid Sales Ban following its accession to the
WTO is still to be seen.
4. Direct Marketing after the 1998 Ban
Companies engaging in direct sales did not simply disappear
following the April 1998 ban. In fiscal year 1999, Amway China
experienced sales revenue of approximately $225.6 million. 86 Although not
yet enough to bring the China division out of the red, the 1999 sales volume
was double that of 1998.87 Subsequent to the initial blanket ban, Chinese
authorities compromised and allowed Amway to continue its business in
China, provided it transitioned to more traditional retail sales methods.
88
Eva Cheng, president and chief executive officer of Amway, expressed
confidence that the business would continue to grow regardless of the 1998
ban, explaining that "due to the increase of sales, 2000 might be the first
year the company will be able to make money since the ban of pyramid sales
" Id. at 1488.
85 William J. McDonald, The Ban in China: How Direct Marketing is Affected, in DIRECT
MARKETING (June 1998), at http://www.newthinking.com/.
86 Tao Yun Gang, Amway Doubles Its Sales, Looks Ahead, CHINA DAILY, Nov. 7, 2000.
87 Id.
68 Id.
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in China in 1998.,, 89  While Amway is still permitted to recruit sales
representatives, "post-ban representatives are more like typical service
people, helping customers make orders and bringing the goods to them for a
commission." 90 This new methodology has compelled Amway to engage in
more costly commercial marketing activity, such as promotion and
advertising, to increase consumer recognition.9 1 However, with increasing
sales, the company has no reason to withdraw from the Chinese market,
despite a sometimes hostile administration.92
III. DIscussIoN
The 1998 ban on direct sales is illustrative of China's reluctance to
match its market reform policy with parallel political reforms. As a
consequence of the State's resistance to reform, "China has already suffered
serious bouts of macroeconomic instability and political unrest, and the
prospect of serious reform of state industry creates the likelihood of rising
urban unemployment., 93 Economist Barry Naughton explains that China's
macroeconomic difficulties do not derive from "a weak central government
with inadequate control instruments," but rather from the consequences of
"an activist, interventionist central government with substantial power but
immature financial institutions and inadequate capabilities for monitoring
the economy." 94  China's continued pace of market reform suggests a
heightened need for political adaptation and development to encourage both
domestic stability and the confidence of foreign investors. State action, such
as the direct marketing ban, is a move in the opposite direction.
The major trends to consider in evaluating China's approach are: first,
the individual rights that emerge with private enterprise may clash with
China's tradition of paternalistic, administrative rule, threatening the
traditional authoritarian state; second, various internal and external
influences weigh on China as it seeks to expand its role in the global
economy; and finally, there is pressure on China to develop new business
and employment alternatives, as the State continues to gradually withdraw
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Walder, supra note 25, at 11. The most notable incidents of political unrest were the 1989 protests
at Tiananmen Square in which "[r]apid inflation, popular disgust over official corruption and fear of
looming unemployment spilled over into dissatisfaction about the slow pace of political liberalization." Id.
at 11-12.
" Barry Naughton, China's Macroeconomy in Transition, in CHINA'S TRANStTIONAL ECONOMY,
supra note 25, at 121, 137.
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its support of public industry and state enterprise. These various pressures
suggest that while market reform may necessitate political reform, China's
administration may perceive itself directly threatened by such a change,
prompting regulations such as the direct marketing ban, which clamp down
on threatening social economic networks.
A. The Waning of the Traditional Authoritarian State
The success of direct marketing in China prior to the 1998 ban is a
case study in how traditional corporatist forms of social and political
interaction are gradually shifting toward more individualist forms, and
market-oriented social groups are best positioned to leverage this transition.
As individuals become less inclined to seek their financial and social welfare
through bureaucratic institutions, they inevitably turn to private producers
and interpersonal networks for resources.
The social and political trends that accompany increasingly diverse
markets and growing consumerism threaten the political monopoly of the
CCP. In the early 1990s, the emerging private sector had begun to compete
with the traditionally influential groups, like administrators and party
members, in affecting state policy.95 Tang and Parish concluded that "with
economic reform, and the growth of a significant sector outside traditional
bureaucratic channels, there is more freedom of expression.
' 96
Combined with increasing opportunity was the continuing decline of
the role of work units in providing for social welfare in the 1990s. 9' With
more and more public sector workers being laid off, local governments and
neighborhood committees are taking over the traditional welfare
responsibilities.98 The diminishing role of state-governed work units signals
growing independence for the working populace:
The socialist social contract once promised in-kind benefits and
life-time employment in exchange for worker's docility and
dependence. Under the new social contract, security of
employment and in-kind benefits are disappearing. Instead,
workers now have more freedom to protest, to increase their
95 TANG & PARISH, supra note 16, at 206.
96 Id. at 206.
" Id. at 29.98 Id.
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income, and to move between jobs. The changing social
contract has transformed labor-management relations.
99
New social groups may be gaining a foothold in Chinese politics.
Where once socialist institutions were biased toward the political elite, such
as party members and bureaucrats, there is now a gradual trend toward the
increasing political influence of producers, such as private entrepreneurs and
business managers.' 00 Consequently, economic reform has wrought changes
in Chinese civil society. This move toward production and allocation
through the market instead of through bureaucratic directives means that
Chinese citizens continue to become progressively less dependent on state
institutions and hence less receptive to traditional authoritarian methods of
social control. Market reform is never a purely economic process, but one
that involves interest group lobbying in a political system that must attend to
increasingly diverse and complex interests. Walder describes various
political scenarios, in which party hegemony has declined:
[D]ifferent processes may lead to the same outcome: the
ruling party may lose its internal discipline and cohesion
under the pressures of sustained and well-organized
opposition (e.g., in Poland); in the face of large, but
relatively unorganized, street demonstrations of limited
duration (East Germany, Czech, and Romania); or in the
relative absence of both kinds of opposition (Hungary &
Soviet Union). To complicate matters still further, the
decline of some regimes may be attributed to the failure to
implement long-needed economic reforms (Soviet Union),
while in others political decline may be an unexpected
result of economic reform (China & Hungary). 10 '
Accompanying expanding political and economic freedom is the
inevitable, albeit gradual, breakdown in both traditional and totalitarian
forms of social control, signified in China by the slowly diminishing ability
of the state to completely monitor and control private action, accompanied
by an increase in opportunity to commit illegal activity.' 02 For example,
" Id. at 162.
'00 Id. at 189-90.
101 Andrew G. Walder, The Quiet Revolution From Within: Economic Reform as A Source of
Political Decline, in THE WANING OF THE COMMUNIST STATE 1, 3 (1995).
102 Jonathan Hecht, Opening to Reform? An Analysis of China's Revised Criminal Procedure Law, in,
LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 6 (1996).
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many Chinese perceive recent increases in crime "as a negative, if largely
unavoidable, consequence of the policy of economic reform and opening to
the outside world."' 103 This change in Chinese civil society, with the move
toward production and allocation through the market instead of through
bureaucratic directives, allows citizens to become less dependent on state
institutions and their work unit, and hence less receptive to traditional
methods of social governance and party authority. This trend threatens the
status quo authority of China's governing political party, the CCP, and in
extreme cases, prompts a crackdown, like the direct marketing ban, on
economic and civil liberties.
Also, perhaps the CCP's antagonism to social business organizations
such as direct marketing networks grows out of concern rooted in its own
origin:
[T]he growth of grassroots networks very similar in some ways
to the party's own early organisation and its early fervour.
They hark back to the sects and cults that have traditionally
thrived in the Chinese countryside, where the Party once found
its most zealous supporters. Meetings of direct marketing staff
frequently involve singing, chanting, and inspirational
sermons. 
104
China's reaction to direct marketing networks can be compared to its
treatment of the religious organization Falun Gong in recent years. In 1999,
China's Ministry of Public Security issued a ban on all Falun Gong
103 Id. See also PERRY LINK, THE USES OF LITERATURE: LIFE IN THE SOCIALIST CHINESE LITERARY
SYSTEM 126 (2000):
An even more important factor in the overall shaping of this generation, however, was the
money-making ethic of the Deng Xiaoping years, which led much of Chinese society into
cynicism and naked pursuit of self-interest. A "popular ditty" (shunkouliu) of the mid-1990's,
sarcastically entitled "A Short History of Comradely Sentiment," says:
In the 50's we helped people
In the 60's we criticized people
In the 70's we fooled people
In the 80's everybody hired everybody else
In the 90's we "slaughter" whomever we see
Here "slaughter" (zai), which corresponds fairly well in both sense and tone to "rip off" in
contemporary American slang, is ironic. The sense is to condemn "slaughter" even while
pointing out that it is rampant.
104 Higgins, supra note 81.
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activities. 105 At the same time, the Chinese government launched a
propaganda campaign against the group to gain public support for its actions
against the group. 106 Despite government efforts, the Falun Gong
organization persists, to the chagrin of the State. 107 Like its attempted
suppression of Falun Gong, China's blanket ban of multi-level marketing
networks is rooted, at least in part, in its apprehension of social networks
founded on relations independent of the State.
As China continues to expand and liberalize its market system, its
society and politics must evolve to meet new demands. The modem
Chinese approach to lawmaking illuminates age-old tensions between
paternalistic and adversarial human relations, with the latter gaining ground
since 1978.108 Historically, China has had a paternal justice system:
Moral teaching by the sovereign, men of nobility, and fathers
should prevent disputes. Failing that, local notables might
mediate. If courts had to be involved as a last resort, the
complainant did not sue the other party but launched an
accusation with the magistrate.10 9
Contrast this with the United States democratic system in which the
protection of individual rights takes priority over politically imposed,
societal definitions of order. 1° The key importance in the United States of
private property ownership and due process of law is representative.' Yet,
China continues to respond to the complexities and changing demands of an
increasingly economically independent populace by clamping down through
authoritarian regulations, such as the direct marketing blanket ban, rather
than addressing its own internal infrastructural problems, such as the
absence of an effective regulatory organ or standardized modes of operation
as exist in the United States. This type of response underlies China's
inability to effectively address problems associated with market reform.
10s Kelly A. Thomas, Comment, Falun Gong: An Analysis of China's National Security Concerns, 10
PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y. J. 471, 477 (2001) (citing Notice of the Ministry of Public Security of the People's
Republic of China, in Two Documents Concerning the Banning of the Research Society of Falun Dafa,
PEOPLE'S DAILY, July 22, 1999).
106 id.
o7 Id. at 481.
... JEFFREY C. KINKLEY, CHINESE JUSTICE, THE FICTION: LAW AND LITERATURE IN MODERN CHINA
109 (2000).
109 Id.
"'0 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
" U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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B. China's Expanding Role as a Global Player.
Since the late 1970s, China's role in the global economy has expanded
significantly. Historically, nationalism has been the central ideological axis
of China's approach to foreign affairs. However, with the economic reform
of the 1980s, consumerism has begun to displace nationalist sentiment.'
1 2
The popular response to utilitarian and materialist strategy has been
tremendous, undoubtedly promoted by the success of nearby Asian
neighbors such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Japan, which have served to
illustrate what a mature consumer society can provide.
13
With its expanding role in the world market, China can no longer
disregard the interests of its trading partners and potential markets. The
prevalence of foreign business and economic interests in China has
dramatically increased over the last two decades:
By the mid-1990s China had become one of the world's largest
trading nations, the recipient of more foreign direct investment
than any other country in the world, the largest borrower from
the World Bank, the largest recipient of official development
assistance in the form of low-interest, long-term concessionary
loans from industrialized countries, and, except for the Czech
Republic, the only transition economy with ready access to
international capital and equity markets114
In addition to the psychological effect of the prosperity of neighboring
Asian countries and the domestic impact of foreign capital, China is
influences by its focus on accession to the World Trade Organization. In
July 1986, China formally applied to become a member of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"). 115 At the World Trade
Organization ("WTO") Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar in November
2001, the negotiations that began in 1986 culminated with China's formal
accession as a WTO member.
1 16
112 TANG & PARISH, supra note 16, at 42.
113 Id.
114 Nicholas R. Lardy, The Role of Foreign Trade and Investment in China's Economic
Transformation, in CHINA'S TRANSITIONAL ECONOMY, supra note 25, at 103.
115 Donald C. Clarke, China and the World Trade Organization, in DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA II
(Freshfields ed., 1999)
116 Press Release, World Trade Organization, WTO Successfully Concludes Negotiations on China's
Entry (Sep. 17, 2001), at http://www.wto.orglenglish/news-e/pres0l_e/pr243_e.htm.
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China's membership in the WTO imposes adherence to several
principles that define the WTO trading regime. Professor Donald Clarke
enumerates three of these fundamental principles: existence of a market
economy, the rule of law, and an open society. 117 The issue of whether
China has satisfied the requirement of creating a market-based economy will
be continue to be addressed as China's state-owned enterprises ("SOEs") are
adapted into private enterprise. 8 The second principle underlying the WTO
regime, rule of law, "assumes that a country's political structure involves
government limited by law and a certain separation of powers.""' 9 Clarke
describes the discrepancy between this principle and China's government:
[T]he WTO agreements assume that all member states have
institutions labeled judicial that are fundamentally different
from institutions labeled administrative, and that operate with
some meaningful independence of the executive .... But in
any realistic view of PRC law, there is no such thing as limits
on executive action.'20
It is this authoritarian approach, combined with the lack of
transparency in lawmaking and enforcement, the third principle of the WTO
regime, 21 that is illustrated by the State Council's blanket ban on direct
marketing. Accordingly, the direct marketing ban was a specific point of
contention during the United States-China WTO negotiations, with the
United States pressuring China to remove the ban.1
22
The combination of domestic consumer sentiment and foreign
influence, both political and economic, put pressure on the Chinese to take
steps to support and promote continued market liberalization. China's
interests would be better served by the institution of a stable, consistent
market regulatory system, rather than the by the imposition of restrictive,
case-specific policy.
C. The Demand for New Employment and Business Options
In post-Mao China, market reform has brought an array of socio-
economic changes. While in the past the state was the employer and the
"1 Clarke, supra note 115, at 7.
"a Id. at 8.
"1 Id. at 10.
20 Id. at 10-11.
121 Id. at 13.
122 See supra Part II.D.3.
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provider of social welfare needs, people now find themselves independent,
and with independence comes insecurity. Consumer business models like
direct marketing provide employment alternatives for Chinese who generally
have limited capital for investment, but a great deal of entrepreneurial
incentive in the increasingly market driven economy.
One test of China's success will be of its ability to provide viable
employment opportunities in its transitioning economy. Tang and Parish, in
surveying public satisfaction with reform in China, concluded that the level
of support for reform often depended upon a person's station in life prior to
reform compared with post-reform:
[W]e expect societal and personal material conditions to be the
primary determinant of a whole range of values related to
reform, including general satisfaction with reform, beliefs about
whether the pace of reform is too fast, and whether the
consequences of reform, including economic opportunity and
acquisitiveness, are good or bad.'
23
They further found that:
Reactions to acquisitive behavior and attitudes provide one of
the sharpest demarcations between people linked to the old,
redistributive system and the new, rough-and-tumble market
system. White-collar workers, party members, educated
individuals, and people in Beijing found individual
acquisitiveness repulsive. Many of these groups either
benefited from orderly, internal labor markets in large firms and
bureaus or were close to the orthodox, redistributive center,
Beijing. Several other groups took quite an opposite view of
acquisition. They found the prospects of individual
acquisitiveness and the attendant public display of acquisition
much more attractive. These opposing opinion groups included
manual workers, sales and service workers, private
entrepreneurs, youth, males, and residents of high-growth
cities. 1
24
123 TANG & PARISH, supra note 16, at 107.
124 Id. at 121-22.
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Popular support of reform relies heavily on the replacement of state
employment and welfare institutions with private business opportunities.
Business alternatives such as direct marketing, which leverage pre-existing
personal networks and require little training, are well positioned to fill the
gap left by shrinking government employment.
The PRC's treatment and plan for its SOEs has garnered a great deal
of attention. In 1995, SOEs employed more than two-thirds of all urban
workers (i.e., more than 150 million people), providing them with all of their
health and social benefits. 25 If the state were to simply dissolve its SOEs,
millions of workers could lose their jobs, possibly resulting in social
disruption, even anarchy, on a scale that could make the turbulence of
Tiananmen Square in 1989 seem mild by comparison. 126 China has so far
avoided much of the political turmoil experienced in many of the other
transitional economies through a gradualist approach. Economists such as
John McMillan and Barry Naughton, who ascribe China's success to
gradualism, argue that such partial reform can fundamentally transform
a Soviet-style system. They enumerate the fundamental features of
effective market reform: first, massive entry of non-state firms; second,
a dramatic increase in competition, both among state firms and between
state firms and non-state firms; and third, improvements in the
performance of state-owned firms resulting from state-imposed market-
like incentives. 1
27
However, as China continues to develop its socialist market economy,
the state is going to have to allow and develop sustainable business
alternatives to the urban SOE: "If the combined market transition of society
and the technocratic transition of the bureaucracy are to succeed, the old
incentive structure must be replaced by a new incentive structure that
,,128
emphasizes remunerative in place of normative and coercive incentives.
Direct marketing provides unemployed workers with a rare opportunity for
gainful employment.' 
29
It is notable that some studies have shown that political apathy has
accompanied the modem Chinese focus on economic development. Tang
and Parish, in their study of Chinese urban life also found that:
125 See Bhala, supra note 83, at 1491.
126 Id. at 1482.
127 John McMillan & Barry Naughton, How to Reform a Planned Economy: Lessons from China, 8
OXFORD REV. OF ECON. POL'Y 131, 132-35 (1992).
128 TANG & PARISH, supra note 16, at 183.
129 Mary Kay's Asia-Pacific president, K. K. Chua, noted that twenty-five to twenty-eight percent of
his company's work force was made up of "retrenched workers." See For China, the Direct-Marketing
Ban Hurts, supra note 55.
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By the early 1990's, two new trends had emerged. The first was
a significant decline of interest in political participation. People
seemed distracted by the increasing opportunities of making
money in a blossoming market economy. This sense of futility
fits the description of a bureaucratic authoritarian society which
is characterized, among other things, by popular political apathy
and rapid economic growth. The second new trend was the
decline of the traditional corporatist channels of participation
and the increase of other, informal channels. Unsurprisingly,
with the retreat of the state from redistributing wealth, there was
less need for people to go through official channels to acquire
wealth. 3 0
That is not to suggest that the retraction of political freedoms would
not once again spark protest, as it did in 1989 at Tiananmen. But perhaps
the state should overcome its fear of new social and political networks,
which, for example, emerge from direct sales systems, and focus more on
satisfying the new demands of entrepreneurs and consumers.
IV. CONCLUSION
As China continues to develop its socialist market and expand its role
in the global economy, political evolution is certain. The Chinese
Communist Party cannot maintain absolute control over the person and
politics of its citizenry, as it has attempted to do for the last five decades.
Expanding social and political autonomy is intimately tied to increasing
economic independence. The 1998 direct sales ban represents the failure of
the Chinese to recognize the need for political and institutional development,
which must be concurrent with market reform. Wenfang Tang explains the
changing relationship between the Chinese state and the people, in the
context of an evolving "social contract."
Over the last two decades, China has gone through a significant
economic transformation, involving a fundamental redefinition of the social
contract the government has with society. 131 Tang and Parish note:
130 TANG & PARISH, supra note 16, at 205.
' Id. at 3.
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The socialist social contract promised an egalitarian,
redistributionist order that provided job security, basic living
standards, and special opportunities for those from
disadvantaged backgrounds. In return, the state demanded
sacrifices in current consumption, a leveling of individual
aspirations, and obedience to all-knowing party redistributors.
In time, some of the demands wore thin, particularly when
economic inefficiencies accumulated and the sacrifices in
current consumption failed to translate into long-term growth or
into improved housing and consumer goods. 
132
Tang and Parish further explain the new challenges and emerging interests
of the Chinese people in the modem economy:
The new, post-1978 market social contract makes a different
set of demands and promises. In return for abandoning the
ideal of communal egalitarianism and security of jobs and
other benefits, the market contract promises that giving free
reign to individualistic aspirations will produce better jobs and
greater consumption. 133
It is essential that China adapt its policy and regulations to conform to this
evolving role "social contract."
132 Id.
133 Id. at 3.
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APPENDIX
Circular of the State Council on the Ban of Operational Activities of
Pyramid Sales (Apr. 18, 1998)
The State Council has instituted a ban on the operational activities of
pyramid sales to protect the legitimate rights and interests of consumers, to
promote fair competition, to maintain economic order, and to sustain social
stability. The reasons for the ban are as follows:
I. Pyramid sales operations are not appropriate for China at its
present stage of development, and have resulted in serious damage.
Pyramid selling as a mode of operation is inappropriate due to its
traits of organizational closeness, the concealed nature of
transactions, and its spread out systems of sales persons. In
addition, the Chinese market is not sophisticated enough for such
business operations, corporate management skills and experience
are underdeveloped, and mass consumer mentality has yet to
mature. Unlawful individuals have taken advantage of pyramid
sales to promote heretical beliefs, gangs, superstition and
racketeering, seriously undermining China's spiritual and cultural
establishment and social stability. These unlawful individuals take
advantage of pyramid selling to recruit government and party
officials, soldiers and students, and thus have seriously disrupted
state order in governance and education. These individuals use
pyramid selling to engage in fraud, extortion of money and
property, promotion of the sale of imitation, fake and inferior
quality products and smuggled goods for the purpose of
profiteering and tax evasion. This has seriously harmed the
interests of consumers and interfered with the normal economic
order. Therefore, pyramid sales must be immediately and
completely banned.
II. The operational activities of pyramid sales in any form shall be
banned as of the date of issuance of this Circular. Registered
enterprises engaged in the operation of pyramid sales shall cease
immediately all operational activities related to pyramid sales,
engage in the rehabilitation of pyramid sales persons, settle all
debts, convert to other modes of business operation, and modify or
withdraw business registration with the industry and commerce
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administration before October 31, 1998. Failure to comply with
these registration requirements will result in the revocation of the
business license. Those currently engaging in pyramid sales
without an authorized business license are also subject to this ban,
and must cease such activity or face prosecution.
III. Efforts will be intensified in the enforcement of the ban and
investigation of any suspected pyramid sales activity. As of the
date of issuance of this Circular, people's governments at all
levels, the department of industry and commerce administration,
the department of public security, and other involved departments
must adopt strong measures to enforce the ban and prevent:
(1) pyramid sales from becoming an underground activity;
(2) pyramid sales in the form of double-win or online sales
system;
(3) pyramid sales in the form of restricted exclusive sales,
licensing rights, special permits, franchise membership
operation, direct sales, chains and network sales;
(4) pyramid sales in the form of distribution of membership
cards, savings cards, lotteries and vocational training to gain
membership fees, franchise membership fees, licensing fees
and training fees by cheating; and
(5) any other acts of pyramid sales in any form.
Any activity suspected of being related to pyramid sales shall be
investigated and penalized by the industry and commerce
administration in pursuance with the relevant state provisions.
Pyramid sales used to engage in fraud, promote the sales of
imitated, fake, inferior quality, and smuggled products, and to
spread heresy, gangs, superstition, and racketeering shall be
investigated and handled by the departments concerned. Where
such activity constitutes criminal action, the case shall be
transferred to a judicial organ for prosecution in accordance with
the law.
IV. All central and local governments must strengthen leadership and
cooperate closely with one another in firmly yet safely
implementing the ban on pyramid sales. The ban on pyramid sales
is an expansive order with broad impact and scope, and will be a
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difficult order to implement. Government agencies at all levels
must attach great importance to this order and coordinate under the
command of an appointed government official, to be in charge
until the ban is fully implemented. Organs of the industry and
commerce administration must sternly investigate and prosecute
any acts of pyramid sales which contravene the spirit of this
Circular. Departments of public security must prohibit any activity
that involves pyramid sales, in open or disguised forms, to
maintain social order and stability. Commercial banks must
support and cooperate with organs of the industry and commerce
administration and public security in the work of investigation and
prosecution of pyramid sales. Media and propaganda departments
must intensify their efforts in publicity, extensively publicizing the
harm of pyramid selling, exposing the fraudulent acts of pyramid
selling, and exposing typical illegal cases of pyramid selling to
educate the public and raise their awareness, encouraging the
public to consciously boycott pyramid sales activity. The media
should also make reports on the progress made by the departments
involved in implementation of the pyramid sales ban.
All government organizations involved in the execution of the
pyramid sales ban must be steadfast and proactive and, at the same
time, must be painstakingly careful in their implementation of the
ban so as to maintain economic order and social stability.
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